Personal Identity - Philosophy Essay Example for Free

Personal Identity Philosophy EssayIt is easy to see oneself as the same psyche we were ten, twenty, or fifty years ago. We can define individuation through and through our physical presence, life experiences, memories, and mental awareness of self. One can testify our appendence as a person through our existence as a person. But what makes us the same person? In this paper, I will argue for the unproblematic view of the persistence of indistinguishability operator that it is impossible to determine what single thing that makes us the same person everyplace time. I will support my rent with the refutation of the main composite plant view claims of the embody, mind-set and psychological continuity criterion.Entrenched in the simple view is the idea that face-to-faceised identity, and the persistence of personal identity, cannot be measured through philosophical discourse or scientific investigation. There are a number of opposing tunes, known as complex theories of personal identity. In each of these arguments, the central claim is that either the body, the judgement, or the psychological continuity of an individual determines how they persist as the same person (Garrett, 1998, p 52). To call them complex is a misnomer for each is far too narrow to properly define and explain personal identity.Complex argument 1 psychological continuity John Locke defines a person as a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places (Locke, 1689, p 1-6). This relegatement suggests that, in order to persist as the same person, we must have a mental consciousness which persists through time. We can say that a person is psychologically sustained if they have a mental state that is descendent from their previous mental states.For example, this theory states that a five-year-old will be the same person when they are a 25-year-old, because their mental state in later years is descendent from their earlier years. Counter argument By its very nature, the idea of psychological continuity is flawed. It is not uncommon for an individuals mental state to be changed so drastically that they could not truly be considered the same person. Several examples have been made by Waller sufferers of cognitive impairments such as dementia, people who have gone through stressful or traumatic situations, and war eterans that are affected by post-traumatic stress disorder (Waller, 2011, p 198-210).In any of these cases, it would be difficult to argue that the individual has a continuous mental state more accurate would be to describe them as a snap or break that, effectively, creates a new person. The only closing is that these individuals do not persist, as their psychological states become radically different from their previous psychological states. Complex argument 2 Persistence of the body some other expression of the complex view is the body criteri on.Put simply, a person is said to persist if they exist in the same physical body over time. In this case, the previously mentioned dementia or PTSD sufferers would be considered the same people, as their physical body has continued. The theory suggests a brute physical comparison between body and identity (Korfmacher, 2006). Without regard for mental state, an individual is considered to have a persistent personal identity as long as their body survives. Counter argument This theory lends itself easily to thought experiments, and they quickly expose some problems.If individual A receives an organ donation from individual B, can it be said that individual A has taken some of Bs identity? Surely not. It would be absurd to suggest that having the kidney or liver of another person would affect ones persistence as an individual. Similarly, if individual C had their body cloned, it would not make their clone the same person. There is much more to personal identity than can be defined b y something so comparatively insignificant as the physical body. Complex argument 3 Persistence of the flairThe brain is the functional centre of the human body the place where memories are stored, feelings are felt, and environmental signals are processed. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the brain is so often considered to be the home of personal identity. This theory is a staple of many science fiction texts as a convention, the cognizant brain in a jar or brain transplant recipient is fairly common. Proponents of this we are our brains theory claim that, so long as the brain persists, so does the person. Counter argumentThis theory seems to call forth to consciousness rather than the physicality of the brain, so it is important to make a clarification between the two. Julian Baggini suggests that we should view the relationship between consciousness and identity similarly to the relationship between a musical score and the paper it is written on (Baggini, 2005, pp. 112-11 4). In other words, the brain is simply a reposition space for our memories, thoughts, and self-awareness. Should it not, therefore, be so that an individual could simply persist as a brain in a jar, provided they could be sustained in that state?If the entirety of personal identity is stored in the brain, there must be no need for the rest of the body beyond keeping the brain alive. such(prenominal) a theory could not possibly be true life experiences and interactions with the world are such an intrinsic part of identity that we could not persist without them. The theory that consciousness plays a significant role in the persistence of personal identity is appealing, but it can not be said that the brain alone could sustain consciousness.ConclusionTo call the simple view of the persistence of personal identity simple is almost deceptive deep consideration on the subject quickly turns towards the complex. It is easy to grasp at the categories of body, brain, and mental state, but it would be wrong to say that the persistence of any of those equates to the persistence of an individual. Personal identity is something so much harder to define, and it is harder still to find definitive measures of its continuation. Personal identity is evasive, and fleeting it is intangible, ever-changing. Its persistence is so much more than can be determined.